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Abstract
The current pricing mechanism for carbon in the EU, the EU emissions trading system, only
covers 40 percent of emissions. Carbon taxation currently plays no role. The Commission has
recently proposed to revise the energy tax system in the EU to include a carbon tax component.
This paper evaluates the Commission proposal and considers the possible expansion of the EU
carbon pricing base either by expanding emissions trading to cover more sectors or by enacting a
carbon tax. It concludes that there are strong arguments for expanding the carbon pricing base, as
suggested by the Commission. Nevertheless, expanding the base should done through a unified
system, such as expanding the coverage of the emissions trading system or enacting an economywide carbon tax rather than through having side-by-side taxes and trading, as in the Commission
proposal.
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The EU has set an ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20
percent below 1990 levels by 2020.1 To achieve these reductions, the EU has put in place
a portfolio of policies. The centerpiece is an emissions trading system, the EU ETS. The
ETS requires large industrial plants to buy and sell permits to release carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere, with the number of permits declining over time to meet specified
emissions goals for the covered sectors.2 The ETS covers only 40 percent of greenhouse
gas emissions, however. It does not include key polluting sectors such as households,
most commercial facilities, transport, and agriculture. Emissions from these sectors are
instead subject to command-and-control regulations, such as fuel economy standards for
transport and efficiency codes for buildings.
Carbon taxation does not yet play a role in the EU emissions reductions strategy.
Since the early 1990s, there have been several attempts to introduce a unitary carbon tax
across all EU member states. These attempts failed. Member states objected to ceding
taxing authority to Brussels and were concerned about the economic impact of carbon
taxation. Instead, in 2003, the Commission enacted the Energy Tax Directive.3 The ETD
focuses on improving the functioning of the internal market by imposing common and
low rates of tax on fuel uses of energy, such as transport and heating, and on electricity.
Rates are not related to carbon dioxide emissions (and would be too low in any event)
and the base does not cover many large sources of emissions.
In April 2011, the Commission proposed to modify the ETD so that it includes an
explicit carbon tax. The Commission argued that the existing structure, with a carbon
price covering only 40 percent of emissions, will make it difficult for the EU to reach its
ambitious carbon reduction goals. Moreover, the existing structure covers some sectors
twice and others not at all, creating inefficiencies. The Commission concluded that it is
time to revisit the ETD to make it better align with the EU’s climate policy.
The proposed revision divides the ETD into two components: an explicit carbon tax
based on the carbon content of fuels and a separate tax on energy use based on the caloric
content of fuels. The carbon component would cover most uses of fossil fuels not already
part of the ETS. In doing so, it would expand the carbon-pricing base to around 80
percent of EU emissions. The rate would be €20/ton of CO2 as of 2013.
The Commission’s proposal provides an opportunity to rethink the role of carbon
taxation in the EU. The standard objection to an EU carbon tax is that it cannot overcome
1

Commission, ‘20 20 by 2020: Europe's climate change opportunity’ (Communication) COM (2008)
30 final.
2
The major sectors in the ETS are large combustion installations such as power generation facilities,
mineral installations, and pulp and paper production. It excludes transport, households, and agriculture.
3
Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the
taxation of energy products and electricity [2003] OJ L 283/51.

the unanimity requirements needed to enact an EU-wide tax. If the Commission’s
proposal is to be accepted, however, the unanimity problem must be overcome. Once we
assume that this is a possibility, however, we can consider a wider set of possibilities.
That is, once we allow for the possibility of passing an EU-wide tax, the set of possible
carbon pricing systems opens up. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to evaluate the
possible role of carbon pricing in the EU generally, to evaluate the Commission’s
proposal, and to consider alternatives.
The conclusions are as follow. The proposed revision would expand the carbon tax
base and, as a result, is a clear improvement over the current system. A broad carbon-tax
base ensures that the lowest-cost mitigation options are pursued, thereby lowering the
overall cost and likelihood of meeting the EU’s targets. Going from a base of 40 percent
of emissions to 80 percent of emissions has the potential to significantly lower costs.
Member states seeking to minimize the cost of meeting their emissions reductions targets
should support it.
Nevertheless, there are a number of problems with the proposal. First, the ETS and
related agreements (such as the Burden Sharing Agreement) were negotiated with careful
attention to the distributive effects across member states. Adding a carbon tax alongside
the ETS has the potential to change these effects, hurting poor states. Second, the
proposal creates a dual system, with some emissions covered under a trading system and
others under a tax. Coordinating these systems will be difficult. The price of carbon will
inevitably be different in the two systems. In addition, the administrative costs of running
two separate systems will be high. And, for reasons discussed below, a dual system has to
be implemented midstream, further increasing administrative and compliance costs.
All of these problems would be solved by using a single, unified pricing system,
whether it is a tax or a trading system, rather than the side-by-side tax and trading system
envisioned by the Commission. A single system would ensure that all sectors face the
same carbon, a basic condition of efficiency. It could be implemented far more easily
than a dual system. There would only be one set of rules and one administrative agency
needed to enforce them. And a single system, unlike a dual system, could be imposed
upstream. Finally, it would enhance rather than offset the distributive effects of the ETS.
Put simply, why have two systems with all of the attendant coordination and
administrative problems when the EU could simply expand the ETS? And once the ETS
is expanded, its design could be greatly simplified to improve compliance and lower
administrative costs.
The ETS was recently modified for its third phase. It would be difficult to modify it
again in the immediate future along the lines suggested here. Perhaps the Commission’s
proposal can be justified because it is the only feasible way to expand the carbon pricing
base. While this may be true for the short term, carbon pricing is likely with us for the
2

indefinite future, and if there are substantial gains from better system design, they are
worth pursuing even if it takes some time to implement them. We might think of the
proposals discussed here as being for the fourth phase of the ETS.
Section 1 describes the current system in the EU including data on emissions, the
ETS, Energy Tax Directive, and the proposed revision. Section 2 considers the benefits to
broadening the pricing base. Section 3 considers whether a broadened base should be
achieved through a dual system, as is currently being contemplated, or a unified system.
Section 4 considers whether a unified system should be a tax or an emissions trading
system. Section 5 considers issues in the design of a unified system, focusing on the use
of upstream and downstream systems and how they relate to one another. Section 6
considers the problem of implicit subsidies. Section 7 concludes.
1. The current regulatory structure
Before considering changes to the EU energy taxes and its emissions reduction strategy,
it is important to understand the EU’s current set of policies and the reasons they were
adopted. The current energy tax scheme is embodied in the Energy Tax Directive, while
the centerpiece of the EU’s emissions reduction strategy is the Emissions Trading
System. This section reviews both these initiatives.
1.1 The Energy Taxation Directive
The Energy Taxation Directive was enacted in 2003 after a long and complex negotiation
going back to 1992.4 It requires minimum taxes on all energy products used as motor
fuels or for heating, as well as electricity consumed in similar situations. The base does
not include energy products used as material in production processes, such as chemical
reduction, electrolytic, metallurgical, and mineralogical processes. In addition, it does not
apply to electricity when electricity accounts for more than 50 percent of the cost of the
product.
The rates are relatively low. Most of the EU15 member states except for Greece
already had taxes on energy sources (other than coal) which exceeded the taxes required
by the ETD. Most new member states, however, had rates that were lower than the
minimums, in some cases by wide margins, so the major effect of the ETD was on
accession states (plus coal in the EU15). Table 1 summarizes the ETD and compares it to
4

Detailed histories can be found in a number of sources. Key papers include Jacob Klok, ‘Energy
Taxation in the European Union. Past Negotiations and Future Perspectives’ (2005) Instituto de Estudios
Fiscales Working Paper 21/05 <http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/documentos_
trabajo/2005_21.pdf> accessed 26 July 2011; Stefan Speck, ‘The Design of Carbon and Broad-Based
Energy Taxes in European Countries’ (2008) 10 Vermont J of Environmental L 31; Henrik Hasselknippe
and Atle Christer Christiansen, ‘Energy Taxation in Europe: Current Status - Drivers and Barriers - Future
Prospects’ (2003) Fridtjof Hansen Institute Report 14/2003 <http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R1403.pdf>
accessed 26 July 2011.
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tax rates in member states prior to its enactment.5 The white fields indicate that actual
taxes are less than the minimum taxes.
Table 1: Comparison of minimum and actual taxation in 2002
Energy Tax Directive
euro
Energy Carriers
per….
Unleaded petrol 1000 l
Diesel (Transp.) 1000 l

Actual taxation in member states (2002)

Rate
359

AT

BE

DK

FI

FR

414 507 548 559 581

302/330 290 304 370 304 383

DE

GR

IE

IT

LU

NL

PT

ES

SE

UK

CZ

HU

PL

SI

624 296 401 542 372

628

470

396 504 729 351 409 381 276

440

245 304 403 253

344

269

294 341 729 264 336 255 276

LFO

1000 l

21

76

13

279

68

49

61

166

47

403

5

198

33

85

279

50

0

0

42

0

Heavy Fuel Oil

1000kg

15

36

6

52

57

19

18

19

14

31

6

32

27

14

…

44

0

0

0

0

Nat. Gas

GJ gcv

0.3 a)

1.0

0.3

7.2

0.5

0

1.0

0

0

4.3

0

2.5

0

0

4.5

0

0

0

0

0

Coal coke

GJ gcv

0.3 a)

0

0

7.3

2.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.6

0

0

10

0

0

0

0

0

Electricity

MWh

1 b)

20

1.4

89

7.0

7.3

17.9

0

0

40

2.4

45

0

5.1

22

0

0

0

0

0.3

Notes : a) 0.15 euros for business use; b) 0.5 euros for business use; all taxes without sulphur tax and VAT,
Source: Kohlhaas et al (2004)

There does not appear to be a sound rationale for the ETD as currently structured.
The rates are not connected to any identifiable externality from energy use. The minimum
rates in the ETD do not reflect the carbon content of taxed fuels. For example, if we
translate the minimum rates into euros per tonne of CO2, petrol is taxed at €159 per
tonne, natural gas used as motor fuel at €46, natural gas in for heating at €5, and coal
used for non-business heating at €3.6 The rates are also not connected to the relative
energy content of the fuels. Nor do the rates and base relate to other potential externalities
from fuel use, such as congestion externalities, local pollutants, or national security
problems.
The history of the ETD indicates that it was enacted at the behest of member states
which, for domestic reasons, wished to impose high energy taxes but were worried about
competition from states with low tax rates. The language used was “internal market
coordination.” Absent externalities that cross borders, however, it is not clear why this is
needed. Suppose, for example, there is a local externality from energy use, such as the
pollution of a local resource. A member state may, as a result, want to impose a
Pigouvian tax on the externality. If the energy use shifts to a second member state, the
pollution would now be within the boundaries of the second member state, and it is not
clear why the first member state should care. If the pollution crosses borders or has other
effects on the first member state, then it may make sense to impose a mandatory tax
5

Table 1 is taken from Michael Kohlhaas and others, ‘Economic, Environmental and International
Trade Effects of the EU Directive on Energy Tax Harmonization’ (2004) German Institute for Economic
Research Discussion Papers 462 <http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.42775.de/
dp462.pdf> accessed 26 July 2011.
6
Commission, ‘Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Direction 2003/96/EC’ (Impact Assessment) COM (2011) 169 final 9.
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system. But as noted, the ETD cannot be tied to any identifiable cross-border
externalities.
1.2 The Emissions Trading System
The EU eventually adopted an emissions trading system instead of a carbon tax, as the
centerpiece of its emissions reduction strategy of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by
20 percent below 1990 levels by 2020.7 The ETS is a cap-and-trade system, imposed
midstream on large emitters.8 The emissions trading base is made up of four broad
sectors: (1) iron and steel, (2) certain mineral industries (including cement), (3) energy
production (including electric power and refining) and (4) pulp and paper. It is limited to
combustion facilities with a thermal input of greater than 20MW. Across the EU, this
comprises roughly 12,000 facilities.
The ETS covers about half of the EU’s CO2 emissions and about 40 percent of the
EU’s total greenhouse gas emissions. (CO2 is about 80 percent of the EU emissions
measured on a climate-forcing equivalence basis.) The remaining 60 percent of EU
emissions are supposed to be controlled by other policies, which presumably are
traditional command-and-control regulations such as fuel economy standards and
building codes or subsidies for renewable energy. The major excluded sectors of CO2
emissions are transport, agriculture, and residential and commercial use of fuels (such as
for home heating).
The trading period for the current phase of the ETS is five years, running from 2008
until 2013. The length of the trading period is important because permits issued in the
trading period can be used at any time within the trading period. Because permits are
issued in February of each year but need not be submitted for the prior year until April,
7

COM (2008) 30 final (n 1). Available at <www.energy.eu/directives/com2008_0030en01.pdf>. The
second “20” in the title refers to the goal of having 20 percent of energy come from renewable sources.
The EU emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol are technically separate from the ETS—the
ETS was to be implemented regardless of whether the Kyoto Protocol was ratified, and it continues until
2020, which is after the Kyoto Protocol is set to expire. Nevertheless, the ETS is the main mechanism for
complying with the Kyoto Protocol.
8
Sources describing and evaluating the ETS include A. Denny Ellerman, Frank J. Convery and
Christian De Perthuis (eds), Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (CUP 2010);
A. Denny Ellerman and Barbara K. Buchner, ‘The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins,
Allocation, and Early Results’ (2007) 1 Rev of Environmental Economics & Policy 66; Joseph Kruger,
Wallace E. Oates and William A. Pizer, ‘Decentralization in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and
Lessons for Global Policy’ (2007) 1 Rev of Environmental Economics & Policy 112; Jon Birger Skjaerseth
and Jorgen Wettestad, ‘Fixing the EU Trading System? Understanding the Post-2012 Changes’ (2010) 10
Global Environmental Politics 101; Frank J. Convery and Luke Redmond, ‘Market and Price
Developments in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2007) 1 Rev of Environmental
Economics & Policy 88; A. Denny. Ellerman and Paul L. Joskow, ‘The European Union's Emissions
Trading System in perspective’ (2008) Pew Center on Global Climate Change
<http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf> accessed 26 July 2011.
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permits can effectively be borrowed one year in advance. They can also be banked from
the time they are issued until the end of the trading period, creating a variable banking
period depending on when within a trading period a permit issued. Banking and
borrowing of permits is important because it allows users to allocate more permits to
periods when they are more in demand and fewer to periods when they are less in
demand.9
The ETS was designed with distributive goals in mind. The distributive effects are a
result of the interaction between the member states’ emissions targets and the design of
the ETS. The EU members agreed on an overall cap on emissions.10 Each member state
then agreed to its own national emissions target under the EU burden-sharing agreement
so that the total met the overall EU goal. The member-state targets were set with explicit
distributive goals, on the theory that wealthier states should reduce emissions more than
less wealthy states. Given this target, each member state developed a National Allocation
Plan or NAP which allocated the state’s total emissions reduction target between the
trading sector and non-trading sectors. Each member state then allocated permits within
the trading sector to individual sources of emissions. Allocations in the first two phases
of the ETS were given away freely rather than auctioned. Permit trading is done on
member-state registries, and member states also enforce compliance. The member-state
systems are coordinated through the emissions trading directive and linked because
permits from one country can be used by emitters in other countries. Linking ensures that
a single, unified price for carbon dioxide emerges.
To illustrate the effects of this arrangement in a simple setting, imagine that there are
only two countries, Rich and Poor, each with equal emissions and equal marginal
abatement costs. For example, suppose that each emits 100 units of greenhouse gases.
Suppose that the joint target is to reduce emissions by half, but that because of
distributive concerns, they decide that Rich should reduce emissions by 70 units and Poor
should reduce emissions by 30 units. If they adopt a cap-and-trade system to do this, Rich
would get 30 permits (because this is how much it is allowed to emit) and Poor would get
70. If the cap-and-trade system covers the entire economy and trading is allowed freely
across countries, the market will equilibrate so that each country actually reduces
emissions by 50 because emitters in Rich will find it profitable to purchase permits from
Poor until marginal abatement costs equalize. The effect is simply a transfer of the value
9

The longer the banking and borrowing periods, the more permits look like standard property. An
owner of property can decide when to use the property. This leads to efficient utilization of property across
time. Short permit periods artificially constrain the choice of when to use them, creating governmentmandated and likely inefficient time allocations of permit use.
10
Although the ETS is a central component of the EU’s compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, it
operates independently of the Kyoto Protocol. The member states that are part of the ETS are not the same
as those subject to the Kyoto Protocol, and the time periods of the ETS and the Kyoto Protocol are
different.
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of 20 permits from Rich to Poor. Note that Rich will not meet its emissions targets—it
will emit 20 too much—while Poor will exceed its targets by 20. The overall target will
be met, however, as will the distributive goals so that failure to meet individual memberstate goals should not matter in this simple setting.
Now suppose that only part of each country’s emissions is covered by the cap-andtrade system and the rest is covered by regulation. Permits will trade in the covered
sectors, as above. Rich, trying to meet its targets, has to regulate its non-covered
industries more heavily because the covered industries are buying permits from Poor.
That is, because of trading, Rich cannot reduce its emissions in the covered sector by
more than would occur due to the market mechanisms. Therefore, it has to meet its higher
target in the non-covered sectors. As it seeks more emissions reductions in the noncovered sectors through regulation, the marginal abatement costs in Rich go up. Noncovered industries in Poor, however, can be lightly regulated (or possibly not at all
regulated) because Poor will tend to exceed its goals for the covered sectors due to the
sale of permits to Rich. The result is a partial transfer from Rich to Poor through
emissions trading and inefficiency due to differing marginal abatement costs which result
from trying to reach member-state targets. With only part of the economy in the cap-andtrade system, we get less redistribution from Rich to Poor and a less efficient set of
abatement policies.
Finally, suppose that each country can set its targets for the covered and uncovered
sectors under a national allocation plan. (Under the ETS, member states cannot choose
which industries are covered, however.) If Rich has to reduce emissions by 70, it can
decide how much of the 70 comes from the covered sector.11 If it knows that the covered
sector will simply purchase permits from Poor, which transfers resources to Poor without
helping Rich meet its targets, it has an incentive to set a low target in the covered sector;
Rich cannot meet its overall emissions targets in the covered sector because of trading, so
there is no incentive to set an ambitious target for covered sectors. Rich has to meet its
targets in non-covered sectors and therefore has an incentive to set its allocation to allow
it to do that. The opposite is true for Poor. This is essentially where the EU is now. By
covering only part of its emissions in the ETS and by allowing member states to allocate
reductions between the trading and non-trading sectors, the system does not fully achieve
its distributive goals and creates inefficiencies both in terms of the regulation of
uncovered sectors and the allocation of emissions reductions between sectors.
11

Kruger, Oates and Pizer, (n 8) argue that because the cap-setting process is done at the national
rather than the EU level, it is difficult to estimate likely permit prices. Each nation can allocate emissions
reductions to either the trading or non-trading sector, the total supply of permits is determined by the
separate decisions of each member state. This makes it difficult for any member state to predict the price of
allowances when they set their own NAP. In particular, if a member state wants to set the marginal
abatement cost in non-trading sectors equal to the permit price, it will not easily be able to determine the
permit price because of the decentralized nature of the process.
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Some of this structure will change in 2013 for the third phase of the ETS, which runs
from 2013 until 2020.12 In particular, for the period from 2013 until 2020, there will be a
single, EU-wide cap, and allowances will be allocated on a fully harmonized basis,
eliminating the National Allocation Plans. This eliminates the incentive discussed above,
for nations to set their NAPs in light of the distributive effects of the Burden Sharing
Agreement.
The third phase will also feature more auctioning of permits. With some exceptions
for large facilities in poorer countries, the power sector will need to purchase all of its
permits in 2013 while other industries will need to buy a minimum of 20 percent of their
permits in 2013, increasing to 70 percent by 2020. Industries subject to global
competition, however, will be allowed to get free allowances; these industries account for
about a quarter of total emissions covered by the ETS and about 80 percent of emissions
from manufacturing.
The ETS has been studied extensively and been subject to a number of criticisms.13
Permit prices collapsed during the trial phase. The decentralized cap setting process
creates inefficiencies because nations have to set their NAPs in anticipation of other
nations simultaneously setting their NAPs.14 The current phase, Phase II, has had serious
problems with permit theft in large part due to the use of member states for local
enforcement and trading. Many of these criticisms have been the focus of changes for
Phase III. Nevertheless, Phase III will continue to cover only 40 percent emissions,
creating pressure for a more robust carbon pricing system.
2. The proposed revision to the ETD
2.1 Problems highlighted by the Commission
An ideal carbon price system would impose the same price on all emissions of
greenhouse gases regardless of the source. The current combination of the ETD and ETS
does not achieve this. The primary problem is that the carbon pricing base is too narrow.
The ETS covers only 50 percent of CO2 emissions and 40 percent of all greenhouse gas
emissions. While the ETD imposes a tax on other sectors, given lack of connection to
carbon content, it might be best to think of these other sectors taxed as not having a CO2
price at all. Even if we think of the ETD as imposing a carbon price because it increases
the price of using certain fossil fuels, the system would be inefficient. The price is not
coordinated with the price in the sectors covered by the ETS, it is unrelated to carbon
content, and in many sectors it is far too low. Moreover, there are sectors such as small
12

For a description of the changes and the process that led to the changes, see Skjaerseth and
Wettestad (n 8).
13
See sources in n 8.
14
Kruger, Oates and Pizer (n 8).
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combustion installations and agriculture that are not covered under either system.
A second important problem highlighted by the Commission is that the two systems
overlap. In particular, both the ETD and the ETS apply to paper and pulp production and
parts of the chemical industry. This is likely inefficient. If the overall cap is binding,
adding a carbon tax to a set of industries within the cap merely shifts how much various
industries reduce emissions so that marginal abatement costs are no longer equalized
across industries.
Finally, the details of the systems differ, so that even if the prices were the same and
coverage complete, the effective price would differ. For example, the ETS, at least until
the auction in the third phase, had free allocation of permits. The ETD had no equivalent
grandfathering provision for current emissions. The ETS has special provisions for
sectors subject to carbon leakage while the ETD does not. And the ETS includes a carbon
offset system, the Clean Development Mechanism, while the ETD does not. These
implementation details can greatly affect the true carbon price placed on emitters and
cause systems that on the surface level seem to impose a uniform price to differ.
The Commission argued that in light of the stringent emissions reduction goals that
have been adopted, these inefficiencies are no longer tolerable. Reaching the goals will
be difficult even with the best designed system. A system with substantial inefficiencies
may make reaching the goals impossible.
2.2 Description of Proposed Revision
The proposed revision of the Energy Taxation Directive is designed to address these
problems. It would attempt to eliminate the overlap with, and gaps between, the ETS and
the ETD, and to impose a coherent carbon price on the sectors covered by the ETD. It
would also coordinate the prices in the two sectors and provide similar operating rules.15
To do this, the taxation of energy products would be divided into two components.
One component would be based on the CO2 emissions from the use of the product. Most
uses of energy, other than those subject to the ETS, would be subject to a CO2 taxation
based on carbon content. This means that the ETD base would be expanded to include
the use of fuels in agriculture, and small combustion installations excluded from the ETS
because of their size.
The initial tax rate would be €20/tonne of CO2 and, subject to exceptions discussed
below, would be uniform across all fuels. The rate was set to be close to the projected
price of permits in the ETS. To minimize deviations from the carbon price in the ETS, the

15

The proposal would also include a separate tax on the energy content of fuels. These provisions are
not the subject of the present investigation.
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rate is to be monitored in the five-yearly review of the Directive.16
There are a number of exceptions to the tax. In particular, the proposal would require
tax credits for industries subject to leakage, analogous to the free allocation of permits in
ETS. In addition, it includes rules allowing for lower rates in specified circumstances.
Member states would also be able to impose additional taxes—the proposal retains the
approach taken in the ETD of imposing only a minimum tax rate.
2.3 Evaluation of the proposed system
The proposed system addresses the main problems with the existing tax system listed
above. It expands the carbon price to include almost all uses of fossil fuels, eliminates
double coverage, and to some extent coordinates the prices and other provisions in the
two sectors. The revision, therefore, is a clear improvement over the current system. Most
centrally, by expanding the base, it should lower the cost of reaching the EU’s emissions
reduction goals.
The Impact Assessment by the Commission Staff did not try to quantify the benefit
of expanding the carbon pricing base because of lower abatement costs. To illustrate the
issue, consider Figure 1.17 It shows an initial marginal abatement cost curve (MACNarrow)
and a marginal benefit curve. The optimal abatement is at point a, where the marginal
benefit curve equals the marginal cost curve. The cost is pnarrow. If the base is broadened
so that the marginal abatement cost curve is MACBroad, the optimal abatement is now at
point c. Moreover, even if we do not increase the abatement target, the cost of abatement
at the initial level goes down to pbroad.

16

The Commission considered whether a lower tax rate should be used in light of the decision to
divide the economy into ETS and non-ETS sectors and the subsequent national targets which took into
account relative income differences across member states. As a result of this division, the average price of
emissions reductions in the non-ETS sectors differed from the price within the ETS and in a 2010 study
was found to be only €4-5/t.
17
Figure 1 is taken from Gilbert E. Metcalf and David A. Weisbach, ‘The Design of a Carbon Tax’
(2009) 33 Harvard Environmental L Rev 499.
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Figure 1: Benefits to Broadening the Base

The size of the reduction in costs depends on how much the MAC curve rotates
outward when this base is broadened. This in turn depends on the extent to which there
are low-cost abatement options outside the current pricing base. Therefore, to determine
whether it is desirable to add any particular item to the tax base, it is necessary to know
the marginal abatement costs for the activity generating the emissions and the
administrative costs of including them in the pricing base.
There are a number of estimates of the benefits of wide, as compared to narrow,
emissions pricing systems. One well-known study which gives a sense of the benefits of
expanding the pricing base compares no-trading systems to trading systems, considering
three different systems: trading with the energy supply sector only, trading within energy
supply sector and energy-intensive industries, and trading for all sectors.18 Total costs in
the energy-only case are €7.158 billion and go down to €5.957 billion for the all-sectors
case. Marginal abatement costs go down similarly.
That study is not particularly related to the sectors covered by and excluded from the
ETS; it just illustrates the potential benefits from expanding carbon pricing. To know the
size of the gains from including the excluded sectors in the pricing base, we need to know
what abatement opportunities are available in those sectors. The sectors excluded from
the current carbon pricing system are transportation, residential and commercial energy
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use, and agriculture. We need to know whether there are low-cost abatement
opportunities in these sectors in the EU.
A preliminary issue in analyzing mitigation opportunities in building, transportation,
and agricultural use of fuels is that these sectors, particularly buildings and transportation,
are already highly regulated. Easily identified, low-cost mitigation strategies are already
likely being pursued. The advantage of a pricing system over regulation is that a pricing
system allows individuals to choose their mitigation strategies. Strategies that regulators
do not identify may be best and those chosen by regulators may be dominated by
alternatives. Studies attempting to find mitigation opportunities in a regulated market,
however, are subject to precisely the same information problems as the regulators are, so
we should not expect studies to find a large number of opportunities.
With this in mind, estimates of mitigation costs for individual sectors are available,
but there are not a large number of them. For transportation in the EU, the two major
studies are a “well-to-wheels” analysis by the Commissioner Joint Research Centre
Institute for Environment and Sustainability and a study by the IEA of mitigation
potential of the OECD transport sector.19 The wells-to-wheels analysis report concludes
that switching fuels to reduce emissions is likely costly, with a wide variation across
fuels. The IEA study considers more general transportation policies including additional
use of public transport, improvements in conventional engines, and fuel switching. It
finds that a $95/ton tax on carbon (equivalent to about a $26/ton tax on carbon dioxide)
would produce a reduction in energy demand of about six percent in 2020. Overall, the
potential for mitigation in the EU in the transport sector appears to be modest, which is
likely a result of the large number of existing transport policies already in place.
For buildings, the IPCC summarized mitigation potential at various cost levels. They
find a significant number of very low-cost (in fact, negative-cost) mitigation
opportunities in buildings, even in the EU, which already has a number of building
efficiency policies. For the EU-15, the IPCC estimates that an almost 20 percent decline
in emissions relative to the baseline is possible at a price of $40/ton CO2.20 Nevertheless,
studies of mitigation potential in buildings are fraught with difficulties because of the
complexities surrounding alterations to the building stock, such as local zoning rules and
complex market interactions between landlords and tenants.
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An additional source of gains from expanding the carbon pricing base, one which
would not show up in bottom-up studies, is that many command-and-control regulations
could be eliminated. As noted, the EU adopted a portfolio of policies to comply with its
climate goals and its Kyoto obligations. Only 40 percent of emissions are controlled
through the ETS. Remaining emissions, to the extent they are covered, are under
command-and-control regulations. While it would take a separate, detailed study to
determine the efficiency of the various command-and-control regulations, it is likely that
many are less efficient than a pricing system. By broadening the pricing base and
eliminating, some of these command-and-control regulations, costs can likely be reduced,
possibly significantly.
The detailed, bottom-up studies of mitigation potential in the sectors omitted from
the ETS, therefore, are mixed, showing some potential for mitigation but also showing
substantial difficulties. Top-down studies show greater potential. I am not aware of
studies estimating the benefits of replacing command-and-control regulations with
pricing in the 60 percent of the EU not covered by the ETS, but the gains might be large.
At a minimum, it would seem that covering only 40 percent of emissions is very likely
too narrow a base.
3. A single system as a better alternative
3.1 Problems with the proposed revision
While the proposed revision to the ETD has many merits, it also has a number of
problems. There are two distinct types of problems. The first is that a carbon tax can
offset the distributive effects of the ETS. Depending on the level of the tax relative to the
abatement costs in different countries, it has the potential to reduce the burden of meeting
emissions targets in wealthy countries while increasing costs to poorer countries.
To see this, go back to the example of Rich and Poor where only part of each
country’s economy was subject to trading. Recall that in that case, Rich had to more
heavily regulate its industry to meet its target so that the marginal abatement cost would
be higher in Rich than in Poor. Now suppose that a uniform tax is imposed across both
countries. There are three possibilities. First, the tax is set below the marginal abatement
costs (set implicitly by regulation) in either country. In this case, the tax would have no
overall effect on emissions but would allow countries to replace some of their commandand-control regulations with a carbon price. Both countries would be better off. Second,
the tax could be above the marginal abatement cost in Poor and below it for Rich. In this
case, the effective carbon price is increased in Poor, imposing costs, but is unchanged for
Rich, altering the distributive effects of the prior system. Finally, the tax might be above
the marginal abatement costs in either country, reducing emissions in both countries but
by more in Poor because the increase in the effective carbon price is greater for Poor.
13

Once again, the tax would disturb the distributive effects of the prior system.
If the tax rate is set to match the trading price of carbon in the ETS, then the second
scenario is most likely because the marginal abatement cost will be higher than the
trading price in the rich country and lower than the trading price in the poor country.
Therefore, the tax has the potential to increase costs (and abatement) in poor countries
and reduce costs in rich countries.
The second set of problems stem from the retention of two separate systems for
carbon emissions from different sectors of the economy. Under the proposal, the ETS
sector would continue to use a cap-and-trade system while the non-ETS sector would use
a tax. It is not clear why one would want to combine taxes and permits this way and,
conditional on having separate systems, why the dividing lines are drawn where they are.
With two different carbon pricing systems, carbon prices can diverge in the two
sectors. The systems are not linked in any manner.21 The ETS price is determined by the
overall cap and the demand for permits. It is highly volatile. The ETD tax rate is fixed
except for the possibility of review every five years. This means that the two will be the
same only by happenstance and will most often diverge.
If prices diverge, energy users will have incentives to seek abatement opportunities
in the sectors with the higher price even if lower-cost opportunities are available
elsewhere. If the divergence is significant and long-standing, the resulting efficiency
losses might be large. Moreover, divergent prices can affect business choices because the
carbon price will be different in different sectors of the economy. For example,
combustion installations may choose to stay below or go above the threshold size in order
to get into the regime with the lower carbon price. Similarly, capital will tend to flow to
the sectors with the lower price.
In addition to efficiency problems, having two systems raises administrative and
compliance costs. There are two systems with different sets of rules, each of which has to
be designed and enforced. The two systems will have separate administrative agencies in
21
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each of the member states. Regulated entities may be subject to both systems for different
types of activities and, therefore, have to comply with both. Advisors, such as
accountants and lawyers, will have to know the details of both systems.
Finally, having two systems forces the price to be imposed midstream in the
production process. This will be discussed in more detail below, but the basic idea is as
follows. Fossil fuels enter the economy at a limited number of points, such as well-heads
or places of import. They spread through the economy, touching a greater number of
points at each stage in production. For example, crude oil enters the economy at a limited
number of spots, is refined and then used for, say, transportation at a very large number
of spots. We can think of the process like the roots of a tree, starting out at a single point
upstream and spreading out into a large number of tendrils. For this reason, imposing a
price upstream is administratively simpler—fewer entities need to be regulated. For
example, one study showed that an upstream carbon tax could cover all of the fossil fuel
emissions in the United States by taxing fewer than 3,000 entities.22 A downstream tax
just on transportation emissions would require taxing around 250 million vehicles.
If we impose a carbon price upstream, when fuels first enter the economy, the price
is embedded in the price of the fuels as they are used downstream. If we want to divide
the economy into two sectors and impose a different pricing regime in the two sectors,
upstream pricing does not work because it automatically covers the whole economy.
Instead, to have two separate pricing systems, we have to impose the price midstream or
downstream so that we can divide the economy into the two sectors. This increases the
number of regulated points and increases administrative costs.
3.2 Alternative: A single system imposed midstream
The problems with having dual systems—the distributive effects, divergent prices, and
added administrative costs—can all be solved by having a single system. At the most
basic level, we should ask why the Commission prefers to have two separate carbon
pricing systems rather than to expand the ETS. The sectors newly subject to carbon
taxation under the expanded ETD could equally well be part of the ETS.
All of the policy goals of the two systems could be met with a single system. The
base of the single system could be identical to the proposed base of the two systems. It
could be imposed on exactly the same entities. Exceptions and special provisions, such as
for industries subject to leakage, could be made the same. Economic concerns such as
whether it makes sense to expand the carbon pricing base to new sectors would be the
same, as would hurdles to enactment, such as objections by the newly taxed sectors.
The revenue raised by the two systems would be the same as long as the design
22
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choices are made consistently. Auctioning and tax payments are substitutes; if the ETD is
intended to raise money through tax payments, the same money can be raised in the same
member states and paid by the same entities by auctioning permits. Distributional effects
on particular industries could be matched because the revenues and the sources of those
revenues would be the same. Each and every design choice of having two systems could
be met with a single system.
A single system, however, would be more efficient because it would impose a
uniform price on all emissions. It would be less expensive to administer because there
would be only one set of rules and no coordination problems. Moreover, the distributive
effects of the burden-sharing agreement would be enhanced with a single system rather
than reduced. With a single system, we are back to the base case considered above where
Rich and Poor have different targets and the entire economy is subject to a cap-and-trade
system. In that case, unequal allocation of permits has no effect on efficiency but
redistributes from Rich to Poor. That is, a single system better implements the
distributive choices made in the Burden Sharing Agreement than either the current
system or the Commission’s proposed revision.
A single system is more efficient, is cheaper to administer, and better achieves the
EU’s distributive goals. It is, in short, hard to see the logic behind having both a tax and a
permit system operating side-by-side instead of having a single system.
Note also that there is nothing special about expanding emissions trading. If the
proposed revision to the ETD is because of a perceived advantage of taxes—see Section
5 below for a discussion—the tax could be made economy-wide and the ETS eliminated.
Once again, the core economic issues, such as whether it is appropriate to expand the
carbon pricing base, remain the same; but the single system, an economy-wide carbon
tax, would be more efficient and less expensive to run than a dual system.
The possibility of having a single carbon pricing system appears not to have been
considered as part of the proposed revision of the ETD. The Commission considered six
proposals, but none involved the ETS; they were all modifications to the existing tax
system that retained the ETS.23 Because the idea of having a single system is not
mentioned in the relevant documents describing the revision of the ETD, we cannot know
why it was not considered. A single system would have all of the advantages of the
proposed revision, introduce no new disadvantages, and be more efficient and cheaper to
administer.
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4. Moving the system upstream
The system discussed in part 3 was a midstream tax or trading system imposed on the
same entities as the ETS and proposed ETD would cover. If the EU were to move to a
single system, however, it can do even better by shifting the system upstream. This
section discusses the issues related to shifting to an upstream system. As noted, the core
idea is that an upstream system would be simpler to administer because fewer entities
would be regulated, lowering administrative and compliance costs. A dual system cannot
be imposed upstream because of the need to divide the economy into sectors. Once we
have a single system, however, an upstream shift is worth considering.
4.1 Administrative benefits
The use of fossil fuels spread through the economy in a tree-like structure with the
number of branches expanding as we move down. At the top are the relatively small
number of fossil fuel sources, places where fuels enter the economy. These can be either
extraction sites or places of importation, or, moving one step downstream, refineries and
processors. Midstream, there are a large number of places where fuel is combusted, such
as industrial facilities, power plants, vehicles, and buildings. Finally, all the way
downstream, we can think of consumption of a good that was produced using energy as
the ultimate source of emissions.
An upstream price can be administered at a much lower cost than a downstream
price. As noted, one study of carbon taxation in the US estimated that an upstream carbon
tax could capture all fossil fuel emissions by taxing less than 3,000 entities.24 A
downstream tax would require taxing all 300 million consumers in the U.S., an increase
in magnitude of five orders in the number of taxpayers. The number of regulated entities
under a midstream system would depend on the precise details of the system, but the EU
ETS already includes about 12,000 entities.
In the EU context, broadening while retaining midstream imposition would likely
increase the number of covered entities, possibly by a large margin. If the EU instead
shifted the system upstream, it could greatly reduce the number of entities that had to
comply with the system. For example, there are only 104 oil refineries in the EU.25
Taxing these refineries plus the import of refined products would capture all of the
emissions from petroleum. I have been unable to find the number of natural gas operators
or processors in the EU. In the US, which is of comparable size, there were only 530
natural gas processors, and the vast majority of natural gas has to be processed before

24

Metcalf and Weisbach, ‘The Design of a Carbon Tax’ (n 17).
Commission, ‘Market Observatory—Oil—Refining & Processing’ <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/
observatory/oil/refining_processing_en.htm> accessed 8 March 2011.
25

17

entering the supply.26 Imposing a price at the processor level would capture most of the
natural gas in the system. Alternatively, the top 500 gas operators in the US had 95
percent of the proven reserves and 93 percent of production in 2006, so these operators
could be an alternative place to impose a carbon price on natural gas. The EU system is
likely similar, although imports of gas are a much larger component of the EU system
than the US system.27
I have similarly been unable to find the number of coal mines in Europe. In the US
there were 1,438 mines in 2006 which supplied essentially 100 percent of the coal in the
US, and the mines are a logical place to impose the carbon tax on coal. Unlike the US,
however, the EU imports 42 percent of its coal.28 If the tax on coal is imposed on mines,
the carbon price would then also have to be imposed on these imports.
4.2 The prior reasons for rejection of upstream system are no longer applicable
Although there were substantial changes made for the upcoming third phase of to the
ETS, expanding the base and moving it upstream appears not to have been considered. It
is not clear why the EU opted for a narrow base with midstream coverage in the first
place and has not considered changing it. The Green Paper on emissions trading does not
discuss the issue and instead simply proposed midstream coverage.29 One of the
background documents to the Green Paper notes that upstream imposition would have
been more effective but states that an upstream approach was abandoned because of
“vested interests and institutional and political obstacles,” but doesn’t name names.30
Although it is difficult to reconstruct from the available documents, there are three
plausible reasons for imposing the ETS midstream. None of these reasons continue to
apply when considering an EU carbon tax.
The first reason for a narrow base and midstream imposition was a decision not to
cover motor fuels, residential and commercial use of fuels, or agriculture in the ETS.
Apparently, some believed that existing taxes on motor fuels were sufficient and that
including these fuels in the ETS would have effectively double taxed them. It would have
been difficult to exclude these sectors with an upstream system.31 Moreover, finance
ministers in individual member states feared that upstream coverage would create
26
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pressure for member states to eliminate local taxes on fuels.32 The Commission proposal,
however, would not include these sectors in the carbon pricing base, so this reason is
moot.
A second reason for midstream imposition is that the Framework Convention, the
Kyoto Protocol, and the Burden Sharing Agreement all measure emissions at the place of
combustion. For example, if fuel which is extracted in one country and processed or
refined in a second is burned to create power for production of a good in a third, and the
good is consumed in a fourth, we could allocate the emissions to any of the four countries
(or among them). The Framework Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Burden
Sharing Agreement allocate the emission to the place where the fuel was burned, which is
essentially arbitrary. The EU ETS midstream system follows this allocation. Because
each country determines its own ETS targets, only a midstream trading system can allow
each country to control its compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. For example, suppose
that France imported and used gasoline that was refined in Germany. If the regulatory
system is imposed upstream at the refinery level, Germany’s regulatory decisions would
determine (in part) France’s emissions as calculated under the Kyoto Protocol and the
Framework Convention.
This reason is also no longer applicable. The third phase of the ETS eliminates the
National Allocation Plans so that countries no longer have local control of how the ETS
applies to them. Moreover, if mandatory carbon pricing covers all or almost all uses of
fossil fuels, discretion over the regulation of non-covered sectors is reduced.
A final reason is that an upstream cap-and-trade system might have been seen as
resembling a tax, potentially triggering the unanimity rule for taxes in the EU. A
midstream cap-and-trade system would not need unanimity to pass and therefore was
seen as the safer option in terms of avoiding potential legal challenges.33 An EU-wide
carbon tax, however, will have to overcome these obstacles.
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4.3 Distributional issue, in general
Within a closed economy, an upstream price and a comprehensive mid- or downstream
price cover the same emissions, but, as noted, the upstream price is far simpler to
administer. If there is more than one jurisdiction, however, substantive differences
between upstream and downstream taxation can arise. Consider two jurisdictions, each of
which has producers and consumers. Producers in each jurisdiction sell to consumers in
both jurisdictions. Figure 2 provides a graphic:
Figure 2: Multiple country production and consumption
Country A

Country B

Producer

Producer

Consumers

Consumers

Consider an upstream tax on producers. (For simplicity, I will use a tax as an
example; the analysis is the same for a trading system.) Each jurisdiction would receive
the tax revenue from production in that region. If the tax rates in the countries differ, the
tax rates on different types of goods available to the consumers will differ but the rates on
consumers in the two countries for a given type of good will be the same.
Compare that to a downstream tax on consumption. In this case, the country where
consumption takes place will receive the revenue. In addition, consumers in a given
country will face the same tax on all goods but the tax rate may vary from the taxes faced
by consumers in the other country.
Note that in the VAT context, we think that production taxes (origin-based taxes)
and consumption taxes (destination-based taxes) produce the same result in the long run.
This is because in the long run, a country can only consume what it produces. For periods
of time, it can run deficits or surpluses, but in present value the two have to be the same.
This is not true in a carbon tax because a carbon tax is, broadly speaking, on only a single
component of production—the use of fossil fuels. Even though imports will equal exports
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in present value, imports of embedded carbon need not equal exports of embedded carbon
in total or in present value. For example, country A could trade energy-intensive products
for services every year indefinitely. Trade, overall, would balance, but the import and
export of carbon would not.
Another important difference between upstream and downstream taxes is what is
called carbon leakage. If a country imposes taxes upstream on production, producers can
move to another jurisdiction with a lower tax and sell the same goods into the original
jurisdiction. Carbon leakage is defined as the increase in emissions in non-taxing regions
relative to the emissions reductions in the taxing regions. It is entirely inefficient in that
there is a distortion in production decisions and no resulting tax revenue. Most estimates
of carbon leakage are in the range of 15-25 percent, although some outlying estimates are
much higher or lower.34
In a downstream (consumption) tax, there is no advantage to shifting production to
another country because the tax is based on where the good is consumed. As a result,
production decisions are not distorted. A downstream tax effectively eliminates leakage
from the shifting of the location of production. Leakage can still occur in a downstream
tax, however, because a downstream tax in one jurisdiction can lower the global price of
fossil fuels, resulting in an increase in consumption in other jurisdictions. One study
estimated that leakage in a consumption (downstream) tax is about half of the leakage in
a production (upstream) tax, at least in the medium term. (In the long term, production
leakage might be much higher because we may see greater shifts in production location
over time.)35
If a country taxes production but imposes a tax on imports equal to the carbon
footprint of a good and rebates taxes previously on export, it will have converted the
production tax into a consumption tax. Production in the home country will be taxed only
to the extent the goods are consumed at home. Production in the foreign country will also
be taxed to the extent the goods are consumed in the home country. Border tax
adjustments, therefore, have the same effect on carbon leakage as a shift from an
upstream tax to a downstream tax. If we believe the Elliott, et al estimates, border tax
adjustments eliminate about half of carbon leakage.
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Border tax adjustments of this sort are different from border taxes in the VAT
context. In a VAT, border tax adjustments are relatively simple because they can be
based on price. On export, we simply need to multiply the price paid by the exporter by
the tax rate to determine the rebate. On import, we simply impose a tax on the full price
of the good for the first domestic purchase. Border tax adjustments in a VAT also have
no present-value revenue effect (assuming constant tax rates) because the present value of
imports has to equal the present value of exports. In a carbon tax, border tax adjustments
are equal to the tax that would have been imposed in a production tax if the good had
been produced locally, which means that we have to know the carbon footprint of
imported and exported goods. Knowing the carbon footprint of imported goods will be
particularly difficult and in many cases impossible. Moreover, because carbon imports
and exports will not, in general, be equal either in total or in present value, border tax
adjustments in a carbon tax will have revenue effects. If the nation is a net importer of
carbon, it raises money; and if the nation is a net exporter of carbon, it loses money.
There is a substantial literature on estimating carbon footprints using input-output
tables.36 Although details vary across studies, the methodology is relatively
straightforward and involves tracing goods through the production process. The carbon
produced at any given stage of production essentially moves with the good through the
production process, establishing an overall footprint for a given product. One study
estimated that for the year 2004, the EU was the largest net importer of carbon for the
regions examined.37 It consumed 5,449 MT of carbon but directly emitted 4,683. The
difference is the importation of carbon-intensive goods. The US was also a net importer,
while China was a net exporter.
Application of the methodology for computing border tax adjustments within the
context of a working tax system, however, would be difficult. To determine a carbon
footprint, we have to know the emissions when a good is produced. This requires
knowing the production method for each good for each country along with the details of
the related energy sources. Even for a good produced in a single country, this is complex
and the data will be uncertain. Moreover, many goods are jointly produced in multiple
countries: an automobile may have parts produced in a dozen countries and may be
assembled in yet another before it is imported. The production methods and locations can
change rapidly. Energy sources change; a given production plant may usually draw
power from a dedicated power source but occasionally draw power from the grid. Even
36
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the best estimates of carbon footprints tend to use broad product categories and still have
substantial margins of error. The burden on a border agent to properly determine carbon
footprints and the resulting border tax would be overwhelming.
Moreover, while border tax adjustments are clearly legal in the VAT context, it is far
from certain border tax adjustments for a carbon tax are. The central question appears to
be whether a country may impose taxes at the border based on the production method for
a good.38 Note that as an economic matter this makes no sense. It is clear that a
consumption tax would be legal and a production tax with border tax adjustments is just a
method of implementing a consumption tax. Nevertheless, the trade rules appear to make
a distinction, and it may be illegal to impose border taxes on embedded carbon.
Within the EU, the issues are similar but somewhat simpler. If the central authority
coordinates tax rates within the member state, there will be no leakage with either a
production or consumption tax because shifting locations within the federation will not
change taxes. Leakage depends on differential taxation, which can be eliminated through
central control. (There will still be leakage from the EU to the rest of the world.) The
main effect of the choice of an upstream or downstream tax (aside from the
administrative advantages of an upstream tax) is that different countries will get the
revenue. In an upstream tax, countries that extract or refine fossil fuels will get the
revenue while in a downstream tax, the country of consumption gets it (and similarly for
midstream taxes, the country where production takes place gets the revenue).
Internal border tax adjustments can convert a production tax to a consumption tax
and, therefore, change which country gets the revenue. To illustrate, suppose that all
fossil fuel combustion occurs in Country A and Country B production is of services. The
two trade so that consumers in both countries consume equal amounts of services and
energy-intensive goods. Under a production tax, Country A gets all of the revenue. Under
a consumption tax, the two countries split the revenue equally as consumers in the two
countries consume equal amounts of the energy-intensive good. In a production tax with
border adjustments, when energy-intensive goods are exported from Country A, it would
get a rebate of the tax. When border adjustments are imposed to Country B, it must pay
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the tax. If the taxes are at the same rate, the effect is as if Country A simply paid Country
B the tax it collected on the production of those goods.
Border taxes within the EU, however, would be very costly and impede the free flow
of goods simply because of the administrative costs. It would require constant monitoring
of embedded carbon flows and rebates or impositions of taxes. An alternative would be to
have countries make transfer payments to one another based on net imports and exports
of embedded carbon using economy-wide measures. We would use the same carbon
footprint calculations discussed above but internally for member states rather than for the
world as a whole. This would tell us the net imports and exports of carbon for each
member state. Transfer payments based on these calculations would mimic the effect of
actual border adjustments without the need for customs agents imposing taxes as goods
move internally in the EU. In fact, transfers can be designed to allocate tax revenue to the
countries involved in the chain of production completely as desired. Therefore, it makes
sense to choose the administratively simplest system—an upstream tax—and make
corresponding transfer payments, if desired, to achieve the effect of a mid- or
downstream tax
Note, finally, that if a cap-and-trade system is used and permits are given away, the
entity receiving the permit often receives a windfall. Estimates show that free allocation
of permits greatly overcompensates industry for their costs of compliance with a cap-andtrade system.39 The choice of an upstream or downstream cap-and-trade system will
determine which industries and countries receive these windfalls. Countries can be
expected to want the industries in their jurisdiction to receive windfalls and, hence, will
want the imposition of the cap-and-trade system to fall within their borders.
4.4 Distributive issues: Blocking industries and implicit subsidies
A final concern about shifting the system upstream is that it might not be as easy to give
implicit subsidies to regulated industries. In particular, the National Allocation Plan
allows countries to choose the extent of reductions in the ETS sector. Moreover, free
allowance allocation can provide a very substantial subsidy to the industry receiving the
allocation. By providing implicit subsidies, industries or member states that might have
blocked enactment can be bought out. To some extent this last rationale will be
eliminated in the third phase of the ETS because the third phase will have an EU-wide
cap rather than the National Allocation Plans and because the third phase will require
auctioning of permits. Derogations for some Central and Eastern European member
states, however, allow some of these subsidies to be retained.
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Moving the system upstream would not change these calculations to the extent that it
would not shift the regulated entity. For example, if the relevant blocking entity is a
power producer, upstream imposition may not change the point of regulation upstream.
If shifting the system upstream does move the point of regulation away from a
blocking industry, there are ways within an upstream system to maintain the same
subsidies to that industry. Suppose that there is an important industry in a country, that
the industry is currently subject to the ETS, and that the industry is given free permits or
some other benefit in order to gain its assent. Now suppose that the point of regulation is
shifted to the fossil fuel supplier for that industry so that the price of fuels goes up and,
moreover, the industry is no longer directly regulated. The industry would face higher
costs which would not automatically be offset by the regulatory structure and, therefore,
might threaten to block enactment.
There are a number of ways to retain the prior subsidy. Even though it is not itself
subject to carbon pricing, the industry could still be given a quota of permits (or tax
credits) that it could sell to offset the increased cost of its fuel. Alternatively, if the
upstream supplier of fossil fuels is given free permits, it could be required to pass on the
benefit for a given quantity of fuels purchased by the industry (but not for marginal
purchases). Finally, the industry could simply be compensated explicitly. The EU has a
number of explicit transfers to poor regions or industries, such as the European Regional
Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, and the European Social Fund.40
5. Taxes or trading
Given that it makes sense to expand the carbon pricing base as part of a single, unified
system, the final question is whether the expansion should be part of a revision to the
ETD in the form of a carbon tax or whether the new sectors should instead be added to
the existing emissions trading system. EU member states appear to view taxes and trading
as substantively different. Emissions trading is viewed as a method of reducing emissions
cost-effectively while taxes are a source of revenue.41
The economic literature on the two instruments, however, establishes that this view
is incorrect. Under conditions of certainty, the two are identical; they raise money and
reduce emissions equally. If abatement costs are uncertain, the two can differ but not
because one is a method for controlling emissions and the other for raising revenue.
Instead, they differ in terms of their relative efficiency in reducing emissions. Martin
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Weitzman argued that their relative efficiency depends on the steepness of the marginal
abatement cost and marginal benefit curves.42 The general conclusion following
Weitzman is that taxes are superior in controlling greenhouse gas emissions because the
marginal benefit of abatement curve is likely relatively shallow. If we were to follow this
literature, we would want to expand the ETD to include a carbon component covering all
fossil fuels and eliminate the ETS.
I have argued previously, however, that the differences in pricing instruments in this
context are relatively small and are swamped by the importance of a good design for
whichever instrument is chosen.43 Given that the ETS is up and operating, it may make
more sense to simply expand the ETS than to try to devise a new carbon tax. Because
there is an extensive literature on instrument choice, I only review the arguments briefly
here.44
Figure 3 is a supply and demand diagram with abatement as the good being supplied.
The lower (rightward) upward-sloping curve represents the estimated marginal abatement
cost, while the downward-sloping curve is the marginal benefit of abatement. For a
traded good, the market would set the price and quantity such that the marginal benefit of
an additional unit of the good is equal to the marginal cost. We can achieve this for
carbon emissions (or abatement, the opposite of emissions) by either setting a tax equal to
t* or a quantity limit equal to q*, where the marginal benefit of abatement is equal to the
marginal cost of abatement. Both instruments work equally well.
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Figure 3: Equivalence of taxes and trading under certainty
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Marginal Benefit

Abatement
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Note also that the government receives the same revenues from the tax and the
quantity limit if it auctions the permits. In a tax, it receives revenue equal to the tax rate,
t*, multiplied by q*. If it auctions q* permits, they will sell for t*, so the auction will
produce the same revenue that a tax would. If the government decides not to auction the
permits but instead to give them away for free, the permit system is equivalent to a tax
system in which the same individuals or firms that receive the free permits instead get
refundable tax credits in an amount equal to the permits they would have gotten. Both
systems can equally raise revenue or give away those revenues.
Weitzman argued that if the government’s estimate of the marginal cost curve is
wrong and the government does not update the estimated tax or quantity restriction when
it learns that it is wrong, then the two instruments behave differently. Suppose that the
government makes an estimate of marginal abatement costs and later learns that the
estimate is wrong. Figure 4 is identical to Figure 3 except that it now includes a line
representing the actual marginal cost, which I am assuming—merely for purposes of
illustration—is above the estimate. Given the new information about the actual marginal
cost of abatement, the optimal price and quantity restrictions are labeled topt and qopt,
respectively. If the government does not adjust, there will be a social loss from the
incorrect regulation equal to the difference in consumer and producer surplus as
compared to the optimal system. The (blue) triangle is the deadweight loss from the
quantity restriction while the yellow triangle is the deadweight loss from taxation.
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Figure 4: Comparison of taxes and trading with uncertain MAC

Weitzman shows that the relative size of the deadweight loss triangles depends only
on the slopes of the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves. In the example, I have
drawn the marginal cost curve to be steeper than the marginal benefit curve. As a result,
the deadweight loss from an error in the estimated marginal cost is greater for a quantity
restriction than for a tax. If the relative slopes of the curves were reversed, the relative
size of the triangles would also be reversed.
In climate change, at least for short- or medium-term policies, the marginal cost
curve is likely steep because it is difficult to reduce emissions (increase abatement)
quickly, given the fossil-fuel-dependent energy supply system currently in place. The
marginal benefit curve is shallow because reducing emissions by an increment likely has
little effect on global temperatures. Under these conditions, the deadweight loss from
quantity restrictions is likely higher, leading to a preference for taxes in the climate
context.45
These arguments are standard in the literature and are generally repeated without
question.46 Nevertheless, I have claimed that the argument does not apply in the climate
45
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change context and that we should be largely indifferent between the choice of taxes or
trading systems. In particular, there are three assumptions in Weitzman’s argument which
do not carry over to the climate context. The first is that the government has different
(and worse) information about the aggregate marginal cost of abatement than does
industry. Weitzman’s argument relies on asymmetric information. If government and
industry estimates are the same, the argument does not go through. The reason is that the
government will not systematically set its regulatory policy such that polluters treat it as
imposing the wrong price.
In the climate context, the marginal abatement cost curve comes from the
aggregation of different technologies that span large portions of the economy. No
industry is likely to have a significant (or any) advantage over the government in making
these estimates. Climate change is a global problem, involving thousands (or perhaps
millions) of firms and billions of individual polluters. Abatement will require massive
changes to the economy. Because of the massive, public scale of the problem, firms are
not likely to have a significant information advantage over governments, nor will the
information about abatement costs change rapidly. Firms, of course, will know their
individual costs better than the government will, but the relevant price is the economywide marginal cost of abatement, and firms will have no systematic advantage computing
this number.
Second, the Weitzman argument depends on the government failing to adjust the tax
or quantity restriction when it receives information that it is set incorrectly. In the climate
context, given a tax or quantity restriction, the government will know whether the
resulting emissions quantity or permit price is consistent with its estimates, so it will
know whether the regulatory policy was set in error. To illustrate, suppose that it sets a
tax rate t* based on estimates of the marginal abatement and marginal benefit curves. The
government will expect that the resulting quantity of emissions will be q*. Because it will
have to know emissions to collect the tax, it will know whether actual emissions are
greater or less than q*, making it easy to observe if t* was set based on incorrect
estimates. The same holds for permits where the government sets the quantity and can
observe the price by the minute by simply looking at the current trading price of permits.
Given this information, the government can always adjust the tax rate or quantity of
permits to reflect new information. One may object that this is too difficult given
bureaucratic and legislative inertia. But in fact, given the likely slow changes to our
understandings of the costs and benefits of abatement, tax rates or quantities would not
need to be changed frequently. The EU currently uses five-year periods for revisions to
the ETS. I estimated in Weisbach (2010) that revisions on this time scale are likely
sufficient.
Kolstad and Toman (n 44).
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The third assumption in Weitzman’s argument is that the tax schedule or quantity
restriction is simple. Weitzman only considers flat rate taxes and fixed quantity
restrictions.47 The resulting error leads to deadweight loss. If the regulatory mechanism,
whether it is a tax or a permit system, imposes a price equal to the marginal benefit of
abatement, incorrect estimates of the marginal cost of abatement will not affect the
efficiency of the system. To illustrate, suppose that the government simply announced a
price schedule equal to the marginal benefit curve in Figure 3. Then, if the marginal
abatement cost curve happened to be equal to the curve labeled “Estimated MAC,” the
resulting quantity produced would be correct, and if it happened to be equal to curve
labeled “Actual MAC” the quantity will again be correct. Quantity restrictions can
similarly be designed to keep the resulting price correct.
In particular, the announced tax need only be on a schedule that approximates the
marginal benefit curve. It would simply give a tax rate for a given global concentrations
of greenhouse gases. This would be far simpler than many income tax schedules currently
in use. Quantity restrictions would need to have price ceilings and floors or some other
way for the government to manage the price. Many such mechanisms have been
proposed.
Arguments based on Weitzman, therefore, should not affect the choice of a cap-andtrade system or a tax. These arguments rely on assumptions that are unlikely to be true in
the climate change context.
How, then, should the EU choose between taxes and trading systems? Institutional
considerations should be primary. If internal EU structures treat taxes and trading
systems differently, these differences will matter more than the claimed economic
differences between the two. If, for example, because of its institutional structure, the EU
has an easier time imposing a well-designed trading system than a tax (or vice versa), this
should determine the answer. Similarly, if the EU is committed to emissions trading, then
improving its design, such as by broadening the base, should be the first priority. If the
EU is considering expanding carbon taxation, again, designing a good tax system is the
central problem, not whether it is superior in principle to a trading system.
6. Conclusion
The conclusions are straightforward. It makes sense to expand the carbon pricing base in
the EU. The existing Energy Tax Directive is not well-designed. The Commission’s
proposal is a good start.
47
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Nevertheless, it is clear that the EU can do better. The Commission’s proposal has
the potential to offset the distributive goals of the ETS. It will likely impose different
carbon prices on different sectors, and it will be complex to administer. A unified system,
such as adding the newly-taxed sectors to the ETS, will be more efficient, be more simple
to administer, and better achieve the distributive goals of the ETS. Moreover, a unified
system can be moved upstream, achieving administrative and compliance benefits
beyond those achieved from merely having a unified midstream system.
Moving to a single system would be a big change, particularly given that substantial
changes were made to the ETS for its third phase. Nevertheless, the gains may be large.
The fourth phase of the ETS will begin in 2020, and perhaps the best way to think about a
shift to a unified system is as part of the fourth phase of the ETS.
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